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Loving v. Virginia and Same Sex Marriage: Mapping the
Intersections
By Billy Kluttz
Summary
The Supreme Court case, Loving v. Virginia (1967) legalized interracial marriage. More recently, the state of California allowed for the citizens to vote for or
against same sex marriage. The author discusses the recent California state’s decisions for or against same sex marriage and how often it hinges upon the justice’s interpretation of Loving v. Virginia (1967) and whether it can be applied to
same sex marriage arguments.
Introduction
On May 15th, 2008, the California Supreme
Court’s ruling In re Marriage Cases (Ca. 2008)
declared the denial of marriage rights to same
sex couples to be unconstitutional in the state of
California. Soon thereafter, on November 4th,
2008, California voters passed Proposition 8, a
Constitutional revision defining marriage as a
union only between a
man and a woman. As
the ever increasing
number of cases over
same sex marriage is
heard in America’s
court system, there is
one constant argument–
the holding’s reliance
on the Loving analogy. Decisions for or against
same sex marriage often hinge upon the justice
interpretation of Loving v. Virginia (1967) and
whether it can be applied to same sex marriage
arguments. In my paper, I argue that Loving v.
Virginia does indeed make laws restricting marriage to opposite sex couples only, unconstitutional. The struggles for same sex marriage and
interracial marriage are very similar. Both arguments emerge from the belief that the freedom to marry the person of one’s choosing is an

inherent right and is confined by the equal
protection and due process clauses under
the 14th Amendment. The cases that most
recently legalized same sex marriage in
America, Goodridge v. Dept. of Public
Health (Mass. 2003) and In re Marriage
Cases, cited the connections of same sex
marriage to the interracial
marriage struggle and the
Loving case.
Although
many opponents say the
issues in Loving and same
sex marriage cases are not
related because of Loving’s
racial
context;
closer
analysis shows their shared
goal – the ability to choose one’s spouse
without government intervention.
Loving v. Virginia
Before we examine the Loving analogy,
we must first outline Loving v. Virginia
itself. In June of 1958, Mildred Jeter, an
African American woman, and Richard
Loving, a white male, were married in the
District of Columbia, where interracial
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marriages were legal. After their marriage, the
Lovings returned to Virginia. They were convicted of breaking Virginia’s anti-miscegenation
statute: however, the trial judge suspended the
sentence for 25 years if the Lovings promised to
leave Virginia. The trial judge, Leon Bazile, justified his holding, “Almighty God created the
races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and
he placed them on separate continents. And but
for the interference with his arrangement there
would be no cause for such marriages. The fact
that he separated the races shows that he did not
intend for the races to mix." (Loving 3)
The Lovings moved to the District of Columbia and appealed the earlier court decision to the
Supreme Court. Chief Justice Earl Warren ruled
that although anti-miscegenation laws may be
equally enforced upon African Americans and
Caucasian Americans, there original intention
was mere racial discrimination. Furthermore,
Chief Justice Warren ruled that denying the
Lovings the right to marry because of their differing races violated their liberty right without
due process as defined under the 14th Amendment’s due process clause. In his opinion, Warren states:
Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of
man,’ fundamental to our very existence and
survival. To deny this fundamental freedom on
so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications
so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the 14th
Amendment,
is
surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due
process of law. (p12)
Although Warren’s intent may seem rather
explicit, since his ruling, the broader implications and applications of his words have continued to be argued throughout America’s courts.
Loving Analogy
But what is the “Loving analogy”? Arguments
made using the Loving analogy claim that just as
the Equal Protection and Due Process clause under the 14th Amendment protect interracial mar-
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riage, in the same way, such statutes should
protect same sex couples’ rights to marriage.
Law professor Lynn Wardle and lawyer
Lincoln Oliphant claim there are several
“garnishes” to the Loving analogy. These
garnishes include comparing the suffering of
racial minorities and gays, racism with homophobia, the social/legal discrimination
against mixed race and same sex couples,
the religious views used to justify racism
and homophobia, and the general minority
status of African Americans and gays. Although they use these “garnishes” to mock
and discredit the Loving analogy, I think
their observations of the various ways the
case is utilized are important to acknowledge (Wardle, 2007). The NAACP’s Legal
Defense and Educational fund released the
following statement utilizing one such “garnish”:
The basic principles applied in Loving should
be applied to any state effort to deny any person the right to marry the person he or she
loves. It is undeniable that the experience of
African Americans differs in many important
ways from that of gay men and lesbians; the
legacy of slavery and segregation is profound.
But differences in historical experiences
should not preclude the application of constitutional provisions to gay men and lesbians
who are denied the right to marry the person
of their choice. (Wolfson, 2007, p187)

In his piece promoting the Loving analogy,
noted attorney and gay rights activist, Evan
Wolfson cites the above quotation from the
NAACP. He also cites the following personal statement Mildred Loving released on
June 12, 2007, about the application of the
Loving case for same sex marriage arguments:
I am still not a political person, but I am
glad that Richard’s and my name is on a
court case that can help reinforce the love,
the commitment, the fairness, and the family
that so many people, black or white, young
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or old, gay or straight seek in life. I support the
freedom to marry for all. That’s what Loving, and
loving, are all about. (Wolfson, 2007, p192)

Wolfson includes both quotes to emphasize the
support of the Loving analogy by the broader
African American community, a point that
needs emphasizing since many opponents to
such analogies deny its support by other minority groups and cite the overwhelming racial minority support for anti-gay legislation such as
Proposition 8. In the larger argument for same
sex and interracial marriage parallels, some
have begun to use the earlier California Supreme Court case Perez v. Sharp (1948), which
banned anti-miscegenation laws in California, to
clarify the nature of marriage rights at stake in
Loving v. Virginia. Loving labels marriage as a
“basic human right of man”, but focuses on the
racist subtext behind anti-miscegenation laws.
Perez engages race and its social construction
and shows the need to marry a “person of one’s
choice”. By emphasizing choice and selfexpression, Perez shows the ways that antimiscegenation laws serve to shape societal
norms surrounding gender and race and validates the usage of the Loving analogy (Lenhardt,
2008).
Baehr v. Lewin: First Successful Court
Case
The first court case to successfully make the
Loving analogy between interracial and same
sex marriage was Baehr v. Lewin (Hawaii,
1993). In Baehr, two lesbian couples and one
gay couple filed against John Lewin, the head of
Hawaii’s Department of Health, for refusing
them marriage licenses. Although the court did
not rule that same sex couples had a fundamental right to marriage, they did see the denial of
marriage licenses to same sex couples as sex
discrimination. The court cites Loving in its
opinion and expounds upon the two cases historical connections, “we do not believe that trial
judges are the ultimate authorities on Divine
Will, and, as Loving amply demonstrates, con-
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stitutional law may mandate, like it or not,
that customs change with an evolving social order.” (570)
In response to the court’s holding, Hawaii passed Amendment two to its State
Constitution that explicitly defined marriage as a union between one man and one
woman—much like the current Proposition 8 in California. Although the plaintiffs in Baehr were never issued the marriage licenses for which they had filed, the
Baehr case will be remembered as the first
case to rule in favor of same sex marriages
and as a milestone in the gay rights
movement (Gregory, 2007).
Recent Court Cases that Legalized
Same Sex Marriage
The two American cases that most recently legalized same sex marriage, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health and
In re Marriage Cases, both drew upon
Loving and similar based rationales. In
Goodridge, Justice Margaret Marshall
ruled in support of same sex marriage because she felt such restrictions were discriminatory, “The Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all
individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class citizens (312).” Marshall later
references the Loving analogy directly:
For decades, indeed centuries, in much of
this country … no lawful marriage was possible between white and black Americans.
That long history availed … [when] the
United States Supreme Court held that a
statutory bar to interracial marriage violated
the 14th Amendment, Loving v. Virginia.
As … Loving make[s] clear, the right to
marry means little if it does not include the
right to marry the person of one's choice.
(327)

Similarly, Chief Justice of the California
Supreme Court, Ronald George cited past
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discrimination against interracial couples in his
ruling on In re Marriage Cases:
Although the understanding of marriage as limited
to a union of a man and a woman is undeniably the
predominant one, if we have learned anything
from the significant evolution in the prevailing societal views and official policies toward members
of minority races and toward women over the past
half-century, it is that even the most familiar and
generally accepted of social practices and traditions often mask an unfairness and inequality that
frequently is not recognized or appreciated by
those not directly harmed by those practices or traditions (853-54).

Some may object that I have misrepresented
Justice George’s opinion on the Loving analogy,
and I concede that he never directly affirms the
Loving analogy. He even negates it being used
to argue sex discrimination. However, I feel his
overall comparison of the same sex marriage
struggle to past treatment of other minorities
allows for the inclusion of his opinion in an article discussing the Loving analogy and similar
arguments.
Many have argued against the Loving analogy
because it was called into question and defeated
just four years after the original Loving ruling.
In Baker v. Nelson (1971), two men asked a
Minnesota clerk for a marriage license, but were
deprived of it. They argued that Loving entitled
them to a marriage license because denying
same sex marriage is another form of “invidious
discrimination”. The court ruled that traditional
marriage laws are constitutional and that Loving
applied only to racial discrimination. Yet upon
closer inspection, one can see the discriminatory
undertones of Justice Peterson’s opinion. Peterson reveals his heavily antiquated definitions of
family and marriage in his opinion, “the institution of marriage as a union of man and woman,
uniquely involving the procreation and rearing
of children within a family, is as old as the book
of Genesis (312).”
The court eventually ruled that one only has a
right to marry someone of the opposite sex, cit-
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ing social tradition and procreation. It is
clear from Peterson’s argument that he
does not see sexual orientation as an intrinsic quality. In fact, Peterson never uses
the word “sexual orientation” in his statement. Chief Justice Taney saw no wrong
in his opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford
(1857) that African Americans could never
become American citizens; similarly Justice Peterson is blind to his own prejudice
and uses tradition to justify continued discrimination. Randall Kennedy, a Harvard
Law Professor, discussed such prejudice in
his 1997 article “Loving at Thirty.” He
claims that overtime people will become
less adverse to plights for same sex marriage, “Just as many people once found
trans-racial marriage to be a loathsome
potentiality well-worth prohibiting, so,
too, do many people find same-sex marriage to be an abomination. This frightened, reflexive reaction will likely dissipate in many of the same way that antipathy to the idea of trans-racial marriage has
dissipated.” As such discrimination dissipates; a case similar to Baker can be revisited in the near future without such bias
from Justices (Kennedy, 1997). In the
same way reactionary backlashes to progay marriage rulings, such as Proposition
8 in California and Proposition 2 in Hawaii will lessen as generic intolerance in
society diminishes. Until then, gay marriage advocates must wait and cling to the
grounding of their argument—equality.
Inherent Injustice
Loving v. Virginia legalized interracial
marriages because of an inherent injustice.
The same laws that protect interracial couples’ right to marry must be applied to
same sex couples. As society progresses
towards full acceptance of gay and lesbian
couples, we must look to the past for a
roadmap to overcoming discrimination
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and intolerance. Through understanding cases
such as Loving that signaled the end of other
eras of discrimination, we can learn how to
overcome current discrimination, “that’s what
Loving, and loving, is all about.” (Wolfson,
2007,192).
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